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Context 
 
This paper responds to two different contexts. The first one was the coming UK referendum 
and, whatever the result, the challenge for the EU to reinvent itself or dissolve if it continues 
failing European populations. The second context was a deep questioning in Japan, but also in 
South Korea, about the future of East Asia and of ASEAN: is a convergence possible beyond 
economic interactions? How to breach cultural divides? How to overcome the search for 
hegemony, deep historical hatred, in order to reach and establish a common ground?  
 
Europe: an urgent need for new perspectives 
 
 Europe’s unification process needs to be put in perspective in order to open new 
perspectives on present problems and to search alternative solutions leading eventually to 
policies1. People within national governments and European institutions tend to reject or 
marginalize such research because the institutions and their practices determine how these 
                                                
1 AM Rieu, K. Wilson, J. van Der Dussen, H.P. Baumeister (ed.), What is Europe ?, 4 volumes. 1st edition: 
London, Open University Press, 1993. 2° édition: London, Routledge, 1995. Daimler-Benz Award, Stuttgart, 
1994. AM Rieu & G.Duprat (ed.), European Democratic Culture, Londres, Routledge, 1995, 261 p. French 
edition La culture démocratique européenne, Paris, ESCA, 1995. 
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people think. The problems are daunting: increased competition between European nations, 
rising differential of economic development and innovation capacity, high unemployment and 
uncontrolled mass immigration, insufficient growth, increasing sovereign debts limiting 
investment, growing internal and external insecurity, increased tensions from political 
regimes hostile to basic European values like democracy, individual freedom, market-based 
economy or scientific research. Some of these hostile nations are on Europe’s borders: Russia, 
Turkey, Persian Gulf governments, China. The USA does not anymore effectively protect and 
support the European project: its political elites see the European Union either as rival to 
American hegemony or as an extension of the American commercial sphere2.  
 These problems are daunting but they have a positive side: they require joint research 
and innovative solutions need to be widely debated and implemented. For all these reasons, 
the unification is now stalled and the justifications for it fast vanishing. With the end of the 
Cold War and the globalization of an open market economy, the initial conditions for the 
formation of the EU have drastically changed. New questions are arising and their answers 
cannot be found in the visions of the past.  
 To achieve this goal, different new approaches are opened and need to be explored. 
The first one relies on the present state of research in human and social sciences, on their 
internal debates in Europe but also in East Asia and North America. The second one 
associates Europe’s present situation of Europe with the East Asian unstable context. Some 
Japanese universities intend to enter this debate. It is an historic and constructive opportunity. 
Based on my own research, this paper intends to be a step in this direction. 
 
1. Europe: the trap of an unbroken modern trajectory 
 
As we all know, Europe’s unification process started in the aftermath of World War 2, 
as part of the reconstruction of European economies, political institutions and social policies. 
The project to unify nations at war with each other for centuries was and still is a historical 
event of worldwide significance, with major consequences for international relations and for 
the political, social and economic evolution of many nations and regions in this world. In fact 
this project concerns all nations, which have been affected in their history by the type of 
institutional arrangement (political, social and economic) implemented in Western Europe 
since the early 17th century. This institutional arrangement is called Modernization. The main 
                                                
2 See the report The EU in the world, Eurostat, 2015 edition, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/ .  
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feature of this arrangement is a political structure, which concentrates in a centralized power 
the means to various populations by controlling the territory on which these populations live. 
On this territory and under this political control, the populations have been unified and 
transformed in a “people” managed by a government and a State apparatus. The 
monopolization by a State of the means necessary to control a population on a territory made 
possible the construction of a strong army to defend the territory and the formation of a strong 
police to control the population.  
Michel Foucault in the late 1970ies formulated the real competitive advantage of this 
political structure, of this theory and practice of power. The modern political technology to 
control a population on a territory was not based on State domination, repression and 
violence. A transition took place during the 17th century when European governments in 
England and France realized that the cost of such policies was too high. It was impoverishing 
the state and poverty generates dissent and disorder. A different political technology emerged: 
instead of controlling the populations on the territory, the modern state started to design and 
implement policies and regulations putting the population, individuals, families and groups, in 
the situation of developing their own conditions of subsistence, the wealth of their family, the 
economic development of the whole society and, as a largely unintended consequence, the 
commercial power of the State. The emergence of modern capitalism in the 18th century is in 
Europe the result of a political strategy.  
In other words, the modern political model, the Nation State generated modern 
capitalism. The institutional system, which presided over Europe’s history since the 17th 
century is also the model through which Europeans were able to conceive their joint 
reconstruction and unification after 1945. What divided Europe and lead to these wars is also 
the institutional arrangement (political, economic and social), which rebuilt and unified 
Europe. European modern history remained unbroken. The contemporary European project is 
a reassertion of European modern ideals within the same institutional framework.  
European nations have therefore started to associate their destiny in full continuity 
with Europe’s modernization project since the Renaissance. Politicians and administrations in 
charge of the unification project repeated and adapted the model. The model had a strong 
legitimacy: it provided a guideline and obvious steps to follow one after the other. Europe 
was just reproducing itself at a higher, post-national, level. Today Europe unification seems to 
have unfolded a historical concept. The first step had for goal to harmonize local (i.e. 
national) laws under a set of basic legal principles acting as a norm: the universal Declaration 
of human rights in 1948. The 1951 Treaty of Paris signed by initial or core members 
 4 
established the joint basis of industrial development: the European coal and steel community 
was for fifty years, until 2002, the axis of the European construction. In 1957, was created the 
European atomic energy community (Euratom) to produce and distributed nuclear energy to 
all member states. Discussions were always difficult, but the next steps followed very 
logically with a form of evidence within the same frame: the Treaty of Rome established in 
1958 the European Economic Community. The 1965 Treaty of Brussels combined the 
contents of the Paris, Rome and Brussels in a political structure distinguishing a Commission 
(the European commission), a Council (the European council) and a Parliament. The 
European parliament has limited initiative because the Council, which associates elected 
heads of state and government, runs the European union.  
This political structure has for goal to organize the next steps, which all strictly 
followed the model of the nation-state: to enlargement to 25 European nations having a 
common destiny (both obvious and unclear), to create of a common and open market, to 
establish the free circulation of goods, persons and capital. The creation of a common 
currency (the €) managed by a European central bank followed logically. As conclusion, a 
Constitutional treaty was negotiated, written and eventually was signed in 2004 to organize 
and summarize all from the principles of this gigantic construction. European citizens voted 
the Constitutional treaty with great difficulty. The fact that the ultimate state of the model has 
been criticized and even rejected proves that this construction was reaching its limits. The 
Constitution was summarizing the historical process. At the same time, a new step was open. 
A transition was starting. 
 
2. In transition 
 
This first stage is over. The impact on the European Union of the 2007 systemic crisis 
proves that some steps have been missed, some presuppositions ignored. The trajectory had 
seemed obvious but the outcome of this construction is flawed or at least not adapted to the 
present world (dis)order. The rise of the EU, what it stands for, is probably one factor of this 
disorder. These flaws are weakening European union. The model for the construction has 
turned counter-productive. It cannot be a model for the European union as it has emerged, 
needs to be managed and is growing in a world, which has completely changed while the 
Europeans were edifying their unification. The outcome of this unification and construction is 
unique in this world but it also raises new problems, which cannot find solutions in the 
construction model. Real innovation is required in an inter-national environment, which is 
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still dominated by old political models, the empire model (Russia, China), the nation-state, the 
federal model (the USA), with their cohorts of nationalism, national, cultural, ethnic and 
religious identities, which make no sense, only problems, for the EU future. 
 
When one is European thinking about this historical achievement, there is a sense of 
pride and a feeling of danger. It seems too much for the rest of the world still caught in 
nationalist, ethnic and religious wars of the most extreme violence, but also for a significant 
part of the European population, which did not, and could not, follow the project and its 
achievements. A solution cannot be drawn from somewhere else. It does not exist another or 
new model waiting to be discovered. It has to be invented by Europeans but also by all those 
in the world, who understand the dynamics of this unification process, of this post-national 
construction and its historical significance. The only solution is to examine the process, 
uncover its flaws and presuppositions in order to reform and redesign the structure, the 
institutions and the culture3. The problem is not that the EU can break apart.  
The first risk is that it becomes empty and meaningless, as the USA and Great Britain 
wish it to be, just a common market and nothing else.  
The second risk is more serious: intense pressure, like the present systemic crisis, the 
massive migration crisis and the energy transition, can alter the trajectory in a direction 
contradicting the original purpose, the common ideals and values, to such a point that 
European nations would, one after the other, lose interest in the project. It is a serious risk: the 
EU could turn into a sort of empire like Russia or imperialism like the USA by seeking 
relentlessly their interest and power. The highest risk for a post-national “union” is turned into 
a sort of empire.  
For instance, in response to present migration crisis, the EU could either close itself to 
refugees or let itself be submerged by immigrants for whom there is a lack of resources, even 
in Germany. Referring to European values is not a response to a complex geopolitical, 
economic and social conjuncture. The European humanist tradition leading, for instance, to 
opening up to migrants always had a dark side: a sharp opposition between “us”, the civilized 
Europeans and the “others”, non-Europeans, invaders and barbarians. European civilization 
                                                
3 The flaws of the Union resulting from the nation-state model are the idea of enlargement and deepening based 
on contiguity, the method of hybridization and harmonization, which intended to design norms and regulations 
in all European activities and productions in order to reproduce at the level of the Union the behavior of each 
nation, the search for a common border. The counter-balance for these extensions of the model is the principle of 
subsidiarity.  
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always had these two sides, like most other civilizations. One side can easily turn into the 
other. 
The real problem remains economic growth, job creation, and energy transition. 
Responding to this pressure is not a matter of political institutions but a matter of political 
culture. It does not concern politicians and bureaucrats only; it concerns European 
populations, the conception and empowerment of a European common civil society. The 
present conjuncture is a dangerous situation because this decisive parameter is not taken into 
account. European populations have radically lost trust into politicians and existing political 
institutions. Bur the next democratic wave is still hard to design. In this respect the situation 
in Europe is very similar to the situation in Japan. Politicians and bureaucrats have the power 
to decide and they are not ready to renounce their power and its privileges in order to respond 
to the evolutions of society. If they had to choose between their power and public distrust, 
they would choose their power. From this point of view, the English Tories are right: the EU 
has become a Leviathan cut from European populations. The main challenge in the EU is turn 
post-democracy into a new democracy. 
 
3. The economic paradigm within the political model 
 
 I can only sketch the problems and potential solutions. I am also standing over the 
cliff of present political institutions and philosophy. I don’t wish to stand in this awkward 
position alone. As mentioned before, I see three untenable positions. It is impossible to simply 
respond to present pressures, one after the other, as if there was no yesterday and no 
tomorrow. It is also impossible to dream and imagine what should be. Finally it is impossible 
to refer to any historical model. In summary, the EU is « over the cliff », a dangerous and 
exciting moment. As I see it (I might be wrong or partial), the only path forward is to change 
perspective, to step out of the model and to learn to analyze the situation from different 
angles.   
 The model of European unification was the nation-state as an institutional 
arrangement. The role of the model was to neutralize nationalism, political and cultural 
competition. The common interest was reduced to economic development and its social 
benefits. They were supposed to bring peace and reduce violence. Therefore the economy was 
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and still is the core of the unification project. So there was an economic paradigm4 within the 
model and on the long term this paradigm determined the unification process: an open market, 
the free circulation of goods, individuals and capital, understood as financial capital and the 
human capital. This generated a strong economic interdependence: trade within the EU is 
larger than trade outside the EU. Each European nation depends on the growth or non-growth 
of the European economy, which depends on the growth of the American and East Asian 
economies.  
 This explicit consensus was considering political, cultural and social differences as the 
private life of nations, as differences, which were a fact and could not be overcome because 
they were expressing Europe’s historical diversity. It was explained as respect for cultural 
differences. But what it really meant and still means is that a unified economic sphere was the 
core and goal of the project. But to neutralize political, cultural and social differences was 
also to underestimate the institutional system (in a broad sense) in which economic 
development takes place. 
  This institutional system is quite different from nation to nation. It explains what 
German economic sociology calls « styles of capitalism ». In this European arrangement, 
governments had the responsibility to adapt the national economy and society to respond and 
take advantage of the unified market. But some governments, in Greece, France, Italy, etc., 
chose on the contrary to protect their institutional system. They considered the potential 
growth induced by the opening of unified market as a solution for financing their “national 
difference”, which meant in fact the established social hierarchies and power networks. After 
thirty years, the result is clear: the nations, which chose not to adapt to the new situation 
created by the unification process, did not and could not profit from the unified market. They 
lost jobs, businesses and overall competitiveness. 
 
 One thing is clear: in the end, the institutional system makes the difference in 
economic performance and it also explains this difference. Economic performance cannot be 
reduced to management. To neutralize is not to ignore, but it is an explicit or implicit 
decision, a methodological statement also, of not taking into account the social, political and 
cultural environment and to reduce it to a parameter but not a necessary condition of 
possibility. Furthermore, to separate the economic sphere from its institutional system is de 
facto to reduce it to a market, to a general exchange of goods and services regulated by 
                                                
4 The notion of paradigm is used in his initial narrow sense of Thomas Kuhn: the construction of a field of 
investigation and teaching based on various methods and cultural presuppositions. 
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demand and offer. My intention is not to criticize the construction of a field in which the 
unification process and the original project could progress. My intention is to explain what 
happened and what are today the consequences.  
 This decoupling between the economic sphere and its institutional environment is an 
historical construction, which was studied (for instance) by Karl Polanyi: it is the construction 
of a distinct field and of a discipline studying and managing this studying. There is no doubt 
that the extraction of this domain from its institutional environment participated quite 
positively in its development. It gives this field a degree of autonomy, which simplifies its 
management by reducing the number of parameters having an impact on activities developed 
in this field.  
 The same paradigm5 was reproduced in the 1990s by the USA in order to open and 
organize after the first Golf war the so-called globalization process, a worldwide market, 
which was supposed to bring economic development and growth to the nations agreeing to 
reorganize their economy for gaining access to a worldwide market. Each country had to 
figure out how to adapt its institutional system and through this system its population. The 
strategy behind was that implementing the paradigm was supposed to slowly implement the 
political model6. The problem is that markets, firms and economies are fully embedded into 
different types of institutional systems. Firms certainly compete with each other but what 
really competes through firms, organizational processes, products and services are 
institutional systems. We all know that the success of a company or a product comes from the 
institutional systems expressed in a given company or products. This is why we all buy 
Apple, BMW, Sony or Audi, etc.  
 
 I don’t bring anything new. But the reason for this conceptual denial and voluntary 
ignorance was a deeply rooted tacit consensus for many different reasons. The deepest reason 
explaining this consensus is the belief or idea that any economy, any nation had and has its 
chance to grow and prosper if it adopts the best management technology, whatever the state 
of its institutional system. It is always the same idea: decoupling the economic sphere from its 
institutional system. Be it China, Brazil or Russia, the belief is that it is just a question of 
good management, strong productivity and competitiveness, i.e. a good commercial 
                                                
5 This paradigm is based on various cognitive operations: decoupling the field from its institutional environment, 
defining this field and its different internal or specific parameters, conception of methods to manage this field, 
including the external parameters needed to manage the external constraints on this field, etc. 
6 This is what Francis Fukuyama called the « end of history » i.e. the triumph of liberal democracy based on an 
open economy, a type of capitalism constructed and managed since the end of the 1970s. 
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positioning, good quality, stable and adequately trained work force, cheap energy and raw 
materials. This is quite an important illusion because it reduces the temptation to resort to 
violence and war. Nations, which understand their true situation, run the risk of exiting 
history and to become highly dangerous. The economy paradigm is an efficient illusion. 
 There were in Europe other reasons for this consensus. The French liked particular 
this consensus. They thought they could profit from European economic growth, have access 
to this « common market » and at the same time keep their conception of the state and their 
« republican » ideology. The English participated also in this consensus because they could 
keep their monarchy, their conception of a civil society independent from government, in tune 
with their liberal conception of economic activities. The Germans saw the European 
unification as a way of overcoming the Nazi period and to reconstruct their economy based on 
Ordo-liberalism, their own version of liberalism developed during the 1930s against the Nazi 
regime and inspiring their conception and management of Germany’s economic and social 
system. The other members thought they could only profit from this project and we all did. 
Each nation had its own agenda within the overall unification. This explains the differences 
between national policies within the Union. What is clear is that Great Britain and Germany 
were the closest from the economic paradigm at the core of the Union. It explains why in 
retrospect, they were and remain the two main economic powers in Europe. Institutional 
reforms in Germany after the war created an environment conducive to industrial and 
commercial growth, with great success.  
 
4. « Over the cliff » 
 
 « Over the cliff » is an expression coming from American cartoons: the hero has not 
realized that he ran beyond the cliff. Suddenly he realizes that he hangs in the air before 
falling down. Cartoon characters or individuals fall. But societies do not have to fall; they can 
learn how to fly and land on another cliff. They just have to think fast and radically. I think 
Europe is over the cliff. The fall can take a long time but will at a certain point accelerate. Si 
it is time to think without taboo.  
 
 The systemic crisis, which erupted in 2008 (but long in the making), has deconstructed 
the economic paradigm within the political model. This deconstruction continues and includes 
the political model. Some nations in Europe are not even sure anymore if a united Europe has 
not turned counter-productive to such a point that it endangers their economy and welfare 
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programs. It is obviously the case of England, of Scandinavian countries and of many people 
in Germany as well.  But since 2015, the mass migration crisis seems to prove to all 
Europeans that a unified Europe can help negotiate and implement solutions that no single 
nation could even imagine. Even the Swiss these days are constantly referring to the EU as if 
they were (already) members. The second factor reinforcing the Union is the energy 
transition. A third factor, more controversial for the moment, is the role of the European 
Central Bank in strengthening the banking system and in financing investment for innovation 
and growth. These are reasons why the EU is not really in danger. But to respond to intense 
internal and external constraints, the unification process must be reformed in depth. The EU 
institutional system is flawed. As mentioned before, it is not sure if the EU institutional 
system, this new Leviathan, can be reformed7.  
 If the systemic crisis has weakened the first step of Union by revealing many of its 
presuppositions, design faults and defects, it can also potentially strengthen the Union. These 
defaults are well known: unequal levels of economic development in the EU, “democratic 
deficit”, absence of reforms in several countries of their institutions by fear of their political 
consequences, a level of sovereign debt equivalent to the GDP and beyond, lack of 
investment in industry and innovation, high unemployment and reduced public benefits, rising 
inequalities and violence. 
  
 But the typical and predictable outcome of the nation-state model and its economic 
paradigm was the creation of a common currency. The currency is the main attribute of 
political sovereignty, with the constitution, the border and the army. The model is not dead 
and will still produce its effects for years to come. The Euro condenses all the present 
problems of the EU. It has far deeper consequences than a Constitution: they touch all aspects 
and corners of the economy and society. The present crisis questions its concept, its purpose 
and feasibility. I am not an economist but simply said, in a common market within a 
globalized economy, a common currency requires from the members of this community to 
balance exports and imports by constantly adapting their economy and through their economy 
their institutional system. This balance seems impossible to reach: the Euro is always too high 
and too low for some industries and some nations. The weaker members are supposed to have 
access to credit and invest in profitable and competitive sectors. But this does not happen: 
                                                
7 An obvious solution to reform the Union would be for each government not to reduce the budget of the EU but 
to evaluate how budgets are allocated. The heads of government and state never trusted anyway the EU 
bureaucracy, the Commission in particular.   
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investment tends to cover political status quo and social policies, to finance the weaker 
economic sectors and not the most competitive and profitable ones. The result is increased 
national debts.  
 Countries in the Eurozone trade in a common currency when some, in fact most of 
them, do not generate the revenues to do so. Greece is a typical example. A common currency 
cannot equally profit to all members of a union. The conditions for managing the social and 
economic fundamentals of a common currency do not exist. All Europeans know that if the 
EU has a future, these conditions need to be reached and eventually established. What does it 
really mean? Is it the role of the European Central Bank? Certainly not. It is the responsibility 
of each member state. What does this mean? It means that governments and state apparatus 
have not be able or willing to adapt and reform. This situation questions the institutional 
system organizing and driving the evolution of each nation. Are Europeans ready to transit in 
this new phase of the European construction? It is not a question of individual or collective 
will. It concerns the capacity of an institutional system to reform itself.  
 
 Once more, the institutional environment is the problem and it also makes the 
difference. Politicians and administrators think and act inside the box: they are a component 
of the institutional system. They are duty and legitimacy is to reproduce it, eventually to 
correct it. But they do not have the perspective to reform it. It is impossible to have an 
overview of the whole system, to criticize it according to external criteria. There is ready-
made model. Research in human and social sciences need to step it by multiplying 
perspectives, by “complexifying” the situation8. The core of the unification model is an 
economic paradigm having for goal to neutralize the different factors explaining not only the 
evolution of the economic sphere of each nation but also the political, social and cultural 
constraints on the economy. What is explaining differences in economic performance is well 
known but denied at the same time. Because of this denial, to establish a common market was 
certainly a long and complicated negotiation between various economic and national interests. 
But it was conceptually relatively easy: the method and the goal were clearly in sight.  To put 
into brackets the institutional framework might have seemed possible during an initial period 
dominated by the political model of the nation state.  
 This period is over and the denial also. If in retrospect, to establish a common market 
was very complicated, to harmonize institutional systems is extremely difficult because one 
                                                
8 It is a type of conceptual scaling, a version of the deconstruction paradigm. 
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enters the flesh of societies. To go beyond the economy is to enter real differences. To 
hybridize and harmonize institutional systems does not even make sense. Is it even possible to 
organize a convergence between different institutional systems, without enticing strong 
nationalist or chauvinist reactions? Nobody wants such a convergence because of the 
resulting standardization and loss of identity. But at the same time, differences cannot be 
essentialized because they do have a history, which can be drawn and which is constantly 
under influence and evolving. Differences cannot be denied but they can be compared and 
even imitated. It is all a question of perspective and knowledge. This approach opens two 
ideas.  
 The first idea is simple hint. If the institutional system makes the difference, then 
Europe is not characterized by its economy, by a market-based capitalism, not even by its 
political culture. It is characterized by the interplay of the differences and similarities of its 
different institutional systems. In this case, there is no convergence to be organized or hoped 
for. There are “family resemblances” between this differences and similarities and these 
resemblances constitute a common civilization for Europeans, without being solidified into a 
common identity or culture. These differences cannot be reduced to the study of political 
institutions, social policies, conceptions of society, philosophies and ideologies, the arts, etc. 
Family resemblances cannot be exhaustively defined. It would be an endless list of 
similarities and differences, of influences, exchange and transfer. This endless list would 
reinforce, even justify, the idea that economic phenomena at least can be measured, managed 
and reformed, with tangible benefits. Failed attempts to draw this list, i.e. to define an 
identity, would justify the idea that differences are obstacle, which in the end can be denied 
and even ignored. 
 
 A solution is to change perspective in order to have a different understanding of what 
the notion of “institutional system” stands for. Institutions and their connections are historical 
constructions. The real problem is not the system but the dynamics of its formation and the 
connections of its components. I have analyzed these last years the modernization trajectories 
of societies, more precisely the formation and evolution of the basic structure organizing a 
society and its evolution. This basic structure is the social system, i.e. society as a system of 
different spheres or functions9. The institutional environment is in fact structured by the social 
system. The modernization trajectory is the comparative analysis of the differentiation of the 
                                                
9 There are various approaches and methods, which are not competing but reinforcing each other. 
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different spheres constituting a social system. These spheres are the religious, the political, 
society (in the sense of civil society) and the economic sphere. This differentiation is different 
according to societies. But all European societies have in common a long-term and advanced 
differentiation and autonomization of these spheres of activities. This advanced differentiation 
explains first the secularization process and the transformation of religion from a major social 
institution into a private faith and collective morality. Churches do exist but only as the 
institutional support of collective faith. Europe is a highly secularized social system. People 
who do not accept or share this advanced secularism cannot really live in a European society 
because they belong to a different type of social system10.  
 The initial differentiation is the decoupling during the West European Middle Age 
between the Church and the state. It distinguishes societies based on a transcendental ground 
(ethnic, religious and cosmological), from a different type of society and evolutionary 
trajectory. This divide was a sort of earthquake; it still produces strong after-shocks.  But the 
second differentiation is probably the fundamental one for Europe, with deep long-term 
consequences. It is characterized by a decoupling between the State and society, which in 
England first brought about the concept of a “civil society”, a society made of individuals and 
groups, with their own interests, values and rights. The State is not considered anymore as 
unifying a population and transforming this population into a society, which the state has for 
mission to protect, like a father and his family or a pastor and his flock. On the contrary, in 
the image of themselves constituting a civil society, the individuals give to themselves, 
choose and select a government. This second decoupling has for obvious consequence the 
ideals and institutions of modern democracy.  
 Already at this level, the differences between the modernization trajectory in England, 
France and Germany, or in Japan, are obvious, with deep consequences until today. The 
widening chasm between the State and society opened historically the formation, 
autonomization and identification of a new range of phenomena with their own rationality, 
trade and other activities constituting the economy of a nation, supplying to individuals their 
means of subsistence and welfare. This third decoupling is the source of modern capitalism. 
Obviously the different modes of the second decoupling condition the third decoupling and 
generate different types of capitalism, different relations between the State, society and the 
economy. These unfolding scissions generate also a transformation of conception, 
                                                
10 This statement does not condemn, nor reject Muslims: on the contrary it emancipates Muslim people from 
Islamic religious power. The idea is in European societies, no communities can exist without living according to 
the structure of the social system. The social system is clearly a set of disciplines, constraints and rules. 
European conception of freedom is based on these disciplines and rules. 
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organization and role of knowledge activities. It gave birth in the 17° century to what is 
commonly called “modern science”. Science was from the beginning embedded in the 
evolution of modern societies and it progressively provided a scientific basis to techniques 
and technical development.  In other words, these decoupling, which are happening one inside 
the other explain what was called earlier the “institutional system”.  
 
Conclusion. The political economy of the Union 
 
 The overcoming of the European Union dead end can be explained by the fact that the 
formation and the development of the European Union were based on a political model and 
economic paradigm, which unfolded their consequences in full legitimacy. The systemic 
crisis, which started in the USA and engulfed the whole Europe revealed, proved and 
increased what everybody knew but underestimated: inequalities of development, level of 
education and innovation potentials, of wealth, plus massive sovereign debts. The initial 
European project has not failed but the crisis brought its first stage to an end. This situation is 
forcing all Europeans to analyze the present situation in order to, eventually, overcome it. 
Economic differentials are the problem condensing all problems. The main failure of this 
economic paradigm is to have ignored the institutional environments, which determine the 
joint but unequal economic development of different nations associated in a union. A union 
does not behave and cannot be managed like a nation. It requires a different perspective and 
different methods.  
 To harmonize and construct a common market is one thing. But it does not mean that 
it is possible to harmonize the economies, which are supposed to exchange goods, services 
and competence on this market. The next step of the European unification process is to 
organize collaborations between social systems coming from different modernization 
trajectories. This is the Union present frontier. Is it even possible? I am not sure. The problem 
can be reformulated in a different dimension. It is a question of knowledge and the capacity to 
share this knowledge on a large scale, to train people to these problems and to develop 
research.  
 From the perspective of modernization theory, Europe’s different societies associated 
in the Union have many common features. 
- First, they are post-ethnic societies: the ethnic origins of the population are not 
relevant at this level of development. What people have in common is the 
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modernization process, which fathoms the societies in which they were raised and 
educated, in which they work and have a life.  
- Secondly, these societies are post-religious. Churches and religious institutions do 
exist but religions are reduced to private faith, common morality or radically 
transformed into shared legal values, like human rights, individual freedom, freedom 
of expression.  
- Thirdly, the role of the economic sphere, of its requirements (profits, productivity, 
competitiveness) and organizational criteria, in the development of social systems are 
known, debated and accepted as common to all societies in the Union and in an 
increasing part of the world economy.  
- Fourth, science and technology are considered the source of long-term growth. A 
democratic society has for duty to invest in research and to establish the proper 
conditions for the transfer of the knowledge produced into economic growth and 
social benefits.  
- Fifth, the ideals of civil society, of the independence of people and groups in their 
common life, outside from the sphere of government and State apparatus, the 
economic sphere and the sphere of religion, are fully understood and a basic 
requirement by the vast majority of individuals.  
- Finally, democracy and democratic politics are considered the interface between civil 
society and the economy, a field of constant debate and adjustment. The State 
apparatus has for duty to protect the people under the control of democratic 
institutions.  
 What is typical of this social system in its present stage is the role played by human 
and social sciences in order to study and explain what is the present stage. What people 
have in common is the knowledge they share about their society and this shared 
knowledge is the basis of the political debate. 
 
 This general template is common to all the Union members. It is the frame of what 
could be called the political economy of the Union, which is quite different from the economy 
of each nation in the Union. A Union requires a double economy; the political economy of the 
union is regulating the economy of each member state according to their specificities and 
situation. In other words, cohesion, solidarity, security and collective growth are the values of 
the Union according to which the present problems of debts and deficits could find solutions. 
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I am fully aware this is quite abstract but I intended to show how far an alternative reasoning 
could go.  
 Finally, in a period of systemic crisis and skepticism, I would like to propose an 
answer to the question: What is Europe? Today, my answer would be: the European union is a 
family resemblance between different nations in this part of the world, which have in 
common a modernization process, which has shaped their societies, economies and 
conceptions of knowledge. Through the Union, these nations have experienced that they share 
a common long-term trajectory. From this point of view, the European union has for enemies 
all those, which reject and oppose the modernization process. At the same time, the European 
union has no borders but it has strong limits. These limits are drawn by the different scissions, 
which have shaped the social system shared by these nations. 
 
   
 
 
